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INTRODUCTION1. 
Organised crime2 is one of the main challenges that governments and intergovernmental 
organisations3 are grappling with. Its history, consequences and different forms in South 
Africa are well documented4 and fall outside the scope of this paper. On 21 January 1999, 
the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA)5 came into force. Its preamble recognises, 
inter alia, that ‘the South African common law and statutory law fail to deal effectively 
with organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities, and also fail to keep 
pace with international measures aimed at dealing effectively with organised crime, money 
laundering and criminal gang activities’. The Act has now been in force for ten years and it 
is time to take stock of how the South African courts have shaped its application.
One of the purposes of POCA is to make sure that ‘no person should benefi t from the 
fruits of unlawful activities...’6 It is on that basis that the Supreme Court of Appeal has held 
that ‘[o]ne should not lose sight of the fact that the purpose of the Act [POCA] is to divest 
criminals of the proceeds of their criminal activity and to prevent them from deriving 
benefi t from such proceeds’.7
On the other hand, POCA, like similar legislation to it in other jurisdictions,8 limits 
the rights of those subject to it. The exercise of state power to impose such limitations 
is not inherently problematic. Historically, the common law has always allowed drastic 
restrictions of the rights of convicted offenders. However, the common law and latterly 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa9 (the Constitution), contain safeguards 
designed to protect all those who may be held to have fallen foul of the criminal law. This is 
done by recognising a range of safeguards that relate to the defi nition of criminal conduct, 
the procedures for determining its existence and calculation of appropriate penalties for 
those that have been found to have committed criminal offences. In as much as POCA 
departs from the common law, it is inherently controversial. It does so by creating new 
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forms of prohibited conduct, new procedures for determining whether such conduct has 
taken place and new ways of sanctioning it, amongst which extensive asset forfeiture is 
the most innovative. For these reasons the South African courts have often been called 
upon to adjudicate on POCA. As Michael Avery has written: ‘The now infamous Prevention 
of Organised Crime Act of 1998 (POCA) is steadily becoming one of the most frequently 
contested and controversial pieces of legislation in South Africa and it appears that every 
new judgment relating to POCA adds more fuel to the fi re.’10
POCA is all the more controversial because of its wide scope. It provides for three 
broad categories of offences: offences relating to racketeering activities;11 offences relating 
to proceeds of unlawful activities;12 and offences relating to criminal gang activities.13 
However, POCA is not limited to the offences in these three categories. It is aimed also 
‘at dealing with a wide range of criminal activities, some of which are quite commercial 
in nature...’14 In Mohunran v National Director of Public Prosecutions, the Constitutional 
Court held that ‘the wording of POCA as a whole makes it clear that its ambit is not in fact 
limited to so-called “organised crime offences”’.15 Different penalties are imposed for an 
offence or offences falling in one of the three categories, with racketeering-related offences 
carrying the heaviest penalties of a fi ne not exceeding R1,000 million or imprisonment to 
a period up to imprisonment for life.16
Because of the wide range of offences to which POCA could apply and the breadth 
of its other provisions it is both timely and necessary to look closely at how the courts 
have interpreted it. This paper examines all the reported decisions17 between 1999 and 
October 2009 in which the South African courts have applied the different provisions 
of POCA in order to highlight the following issues: (1) the meaning and applicability of 
key concepts in POCA as clarifi ed by the courts; (2) the nature and type of offences that 
have appeared before courts; (3) the sentences imposed, if any, for offences provided for 
in POCA; and (4) the types of assets that have been confi scated or forfeited to the state. 
Although the National Prosecuting Authority’s Asset Forfeiture Unit has been instrumental 
in the implementation of POCA, the discussion of its mandate, success and challenges falls 
outside the scope of this paper.18
DEALING WITH THE CONCEPTUAL ISSUES2. 
POCA is a complex piece of legislation enacted to deal with complex criminal activities. It 
can be deduced from the jurisprudence of the courts that its implementation has been, and 
continues to be, a learning process for the National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
for the judiciary. The judiciary has had to grapple with diffi cult questions relating to the 
interpretation and application of POCA. One of the major challenges has been to strike the 
correct balance between achieving the objectives of POCA, on one hand, and protecting 
the rights of those suspected of having committed offences under POCA, on the other. The 
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primary objective of POCA is to remove the incentive for criminal activity – that is, to 
make it as clear as possible to law breakers that the conduct that POCA defi nes as criminal 
and the common law offences that underlie it do not pay. Unlike ‘ordinary’ crimes, such 
as murder, rape, and assault with the intention to commit grievous bodily harm, which 
are of no or very little direct fi nancial benefi t, if any, to the offenders, those who commit 
organised crimes (especially racketeering and money laundering) do it with the major, if 
not the only, objective of accumulating as much wealth as possible.
The successful application of POCA is measured not only by how many offenders have 
been successfully prosecuted for organised crimes but also by how many people (whether 
prosecuted or not) have been deprived of property that is the proceeds of unlawful activities. 
It is in relation to the latter objective that courts have developed criteria that must be 
carefully applied to ensure that the forfeiture to the state of property in terms of POCA 
does not lead to the violation of the property owner’s constitutional right to property.19 It 
has been held that before an order is issued for property to forfeit to the state, the court 
must consider whether three main requirements have been met: (1) whether the property 
in question was an instrumentality of an offence; (2) whether any interest (that is, a third 
party interest) should be excluded from the forfeiture order; and (3) whether the forfeiture 
sought would be disproportionate.20 The discussion now shifts to the interpretation that 
courts have given to these three requirements.
Instrumentality of an offence: Section 1(1) of POCA defi nes instrumentality of an offence 
to mean ‘any property which is concerned in the commission or suspected commission of 
an offence at any time before or after the commencement of this Act, whether committed 
within the Republic [of South Africa] or elsewhere.’21 One of the most contentious issues 
that courts have had to deal with has been whether the property in question was an 
instrumentality of an offence within the meaning of POCA. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
has explained, in the words of Mpati DP and Cameron JA, that
 the words ‘concerned in the commission of an offence’ must ... be interpreted so that the 
link between the crime committed and the property is reasonably direct, and that the 
employment of the property must be functional to the commission of the crime. By this 
we mean that the property must play a reasonably direct role in the commission of the 
offence. In a real or substantial sense the property must facilitate or make possible the 
commission of the offence. As the term ‘instrumentality’ itself suggests (albeit that it is 
defi ned to extend beyond its ordinary meaning), the property must be instrumental in, 
and not merely incidental to, the commission of the offence.22
Relying on jurisprudence from the United States of America, the Court gave examples 
of using property that meet the threshold of making that property an instrumentality of 
an offence: ‘the cultivation of land for the production of drug crops; the appointment, 
arrangement, organisation, construction or furnishing of premises to enable or facilitate 
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the commission of a crime; or the fact that the particular attributes of the location are used 
as a lure or enticement to the victims upon whom the crime is perpetrated’.23 South African 
courts have thus adopted a strict interpretation of what forms of use of property amount to 
that property being regarded as an ‘instrumentality’ of an offence. The National Director of 
Public Prosecutions has to prove not only that an offence was committed on the property 
in question but also that the property itself was the instrument with which the offence was 
committed. It has been held, for example, in National Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Braun and another that the fact that sexual offences involving minors were committed on 
residential property did not in itself make the property an instrumentality of an offence.24
It has to be recalled that not every property that has been instrumental in the commission 
of an offence should be forfeited to the state in terms of POCA. POCA should only be 
invoked in cases where ordinary criminal law would be insuffi cient to deal with the 
criminal. The Supreme Court of Appeal underlined this point in National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Van Staden, a case where the National Director of Public Prosecution had 
sought to make a forfeiture order against a car that was being driven whilst the driver was 
under the infl uence of alcohol. In its words:
 It must be borne in mind that drunken driving, which does not ordinarily result from 
organised illicit activity, and presents no special diffi culties to detect and prosecute, can 
attract substantial penalties, and the ordinary criminal law ought to be the fi rst port of 
call to combat the evil. For the Act [POCA] exists to supplement criminal remedies in 
appropriate cases and not merely as a more convenient substitute.25
This ruling indicates that POCA should only be invoked in cases where ordinary criminal law 
would be insuffi cient in dealing with the situation. POCA was not enacted as a substitute 
for existing criminal remedies but rather in order to supplement them in appropriate cases. 
Moreover, it should be used only in cases where ‘detection and successful prosecution’ pose 
‘particular diffi culties.’26
Third party interests: Section 48(1) of POCA provides that the High Court, upon the 
application of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, may make an order forfeiting 
to the State all or any of the property that is subject to the preservation of property order. 
Under section 48(4)(b)(i) any person who has an interest in the property against which a 
forfeit order is about to be issued has a right to apply for an order excluding his or her 
interest in that property from the operation of the order.27
Proportionality: POCA specifi cally provides for the fi rst two requirements – that the 
property is an instrumentality of an offence and that a third party has a right to apply to 
court for his or her interest to be excluded from the property that is about to be forfeited to 
the state. However, POCA does not require courts to decide whether a forfeiture order will 
be proportional to the offence before such an order is made. Nevertheless, proportionality 
is a fundamental requirement of the South African Constitution. As Deputy Chief Justice 
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Moseneke succinctly put it in the Constitutional Court:
 [P]roportionality is not a statutory requirement but an equitable requirement that has 
been developed by the courts to curb excesses of civil forfeiture. Put otherwise, the 
requirement of proportionality is a constitutional imperative. It is imposed not by the 
relevant statute [POCA] but by constitutional disdain for arbitrary dispossession of 
property and unwarranted or excessive punishment.28
In the earlier case of Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions the Constitutional 
Court also held that
 The general approach to forfeiture once the threshold of establishing that the property 
is an instrumentality of an offence has been met is to embark upon a proportionality 
enquiry – weighing the severity of the interference with individual rights to property 
against the extent to which the property was used for the purposes of the commission of 
the offence, bearing in mind the nature of the offence.29
The Court added that the following issues should be the focus of the proportionality 
inquiry: (1) the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the person whose 
property is affected; (2) the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature 
of the property affected and the extent of the deprivation; (3) a more compelling purpose 
is required where the property rights involved are the ownership of land or corporeal 
movables; (4) the reasons should be more compelling as more incidents of ownership are 
affected; (5) depending on the nature and extent of the rights affected, the test is one that 
comprises elements of rationality and proportionality, moving closer to proportionality as 
the effects increase; and (6) the inquiry takes full account of the relevant circumstances of 
each case.30 These criteria indicate that, although the property may be found to have been 
an instrumentality of an offence and there are no third party interests involved, the court 
may decline to order it forfeit to the state on the sole ground that such an order would 
violate the principle of proportionality.
THE SENTENCES IMPOSED3. 
Section 3(1) of POCA provides that any person convicted of an offence relating to 
racketeering shall be liable to a fi ne not exceeding R1,000 million, or to imprisonment 
for a period up to imprisonment for life. Section 3(1) clearly gives the court discretion 
to determine which sentence to impose depending on the facts of the case. Although 
racketeering charges have been brought against various accused, a review of reported 
cases does not give a clear picture of which sentences have been imposed in such cases. 
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This could be explained by the fact that in some cases the accused were acquitted or where 
convicted their appeals were allowed.31 Moreover, some cases dealt only with procedural 
issues32 and, where the accused were convicted of racketeering, the decision is sometimes 
silent on the punishment that was imposed.33
Under section 8 any person convicted of an offence relating to proceeds of unlawful 
activities – money laundering and the related offences – shall be liable to a fi ne not exceeding 
R100 million or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 30 years. Case law shows that the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions has heavily relied on sections 38(2)(b) – relating to 
preservation of property order – sections 48 to 57 – relating to forfeiture proceedings - and, 
to a lesser extent on section 18 – relating to confi scation orders, to deal with offences relating 
to proceedings of unlawful activities. This could be attributed to the fact that it is easier to 
secure a preservation of property order34 and later a forfeiture order than a confi scation 
order. This is because a confi scation order can only be made after the offender has been 
convicted of a crime under POCA or under any other legislation whereas on the other hand, a 
forfeiture order is made whether the owner of the property had been prosecuted or not.35
In addition, the standard of proof for a confi scation order is higher than that for a forfeiture 
order. For a confi scation to be made, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the 
offender derived benefi t from the crime of which he/she is being convicted.36 In contrast 
the standard of proof for a forfeiture order is on a balance of probabilities that the property 
is an instrumentality of an offence, is the proceeds of unlawful activities or is associated 
with terrorist and related activities.37 The fact that it is easier to deprive an individual of 
the proceeds of unlawful activities through the forfeiture proceedings could also explain the 
low number of reported cases where suspects have been punished in terms of section 8 of 
POCA.38
Section 10(1) provides that any person convicted of an offence relating to criminal gang 
activities shall be liable to a fi ne or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding eight years. 
Although gang activity is known to be rampant in South Africa,39 the author’s review of 
reported cases since the coming into force of POCA revealed that no accused has been 
successfully prosecuted for an offence relating to criminal gang activities under sections 9 
and 10 of POCA.40
THE NATURE OF OFFENCES DEALT WITH AND ISSUES INVOLVED4. 
POCA provides for three broad categories of offences: offences relating to racketeering 
activities; offences relating to proceeds of unlawful activities; and offences relating to 
criminal gang activities. As mentioned earlier, POCA’s main objective is to deprive offenders 
of the benefi ts of their criminal activities. As a result, the Act provides for different orders 
that can be issued to prevent suspects from disposing of property acquired through illegal 
activities – restraint and preservation of property orders – and also, when it is established 
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that indeed the affected property was acquired through unlawful means, to permanently 
deprive the law breakers of that property – confi scation and forfeiture orders. The relevant 
provisions relating to these mentioned orders are highlighted below.
For a provisional restraint order or a preservation of property order to be made, the 
National Director of Public Prosecution makes an ex parte application to the High Court. 
Section 25(1) provides that a High Court may issue a restraint order in the following 
circumstances: (a) when (i) a prosecution for an offence has been instituted against the 
defendant concerned; (ii) either a confi scation order has been made against the defendant 
or it appears to the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a confi scation 
order may be made against that defendant; and (iii) the proceedings against that defendant 
have not been concluded; or (b) when (i) the court is satisfi ed that a person is to be charged 
with an offence; and (ii) it appears to the court that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that a confi scation order may be made against a person.
Section 25(1) provides for two broad situations in which an application for a restraint 
order can be made and granted. The fi rst situation is only applicable if the prosecution 
proceedings against the defendant have been initiated but not yet completed. The reason 
is that, if the prosecution has successfully prosecuted the accused, sections 18–24 of POCA 
become applicable.41 The second situation is applicable where the court is satisfi ed that 
the suspect will be charged with the offence and that, in addition, there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that a confi scation order may be made against him or her. This was 
explained in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Kyriacou42 where the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that, for a restraint order to be made, the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
 is not required to prove as a fact that a confi scation order will be made, and in those 
circumstances there is no room for determining the existence of reasonable grounds for 
the application of the principles and onus that apply in ordinary motion proceedings. 
What is required is no more than evidence that satisfi es a court that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that the court that convicts the person concerned may make such 
an order. 
It is important to note that under section 25(2) where the High Court has made a restraint 
order on the basis that the suspect is to be charged with an offence, the court is obliged to 
rescind that order if the person is not charged within such period as the court may consider 
reasonable.
As in the case of restraint orders, under section 38 the High Court is empowered to issue 
a preservation of property order on an ex parte application from the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the property concerned: 
(a) is an instrumentality of an offence referred to in Schedule 1 of POCA;43 (b) is the 
proceeds of unlawful activities; or (c) is property associated with terrorist and related 
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activities. It will shortly be illustrated that all the cases reviewed show that it is only in 
the fi rst and second instances where preservation of property orders and later forfeiture 
orders have been issued. There is no known case in which a preservation of property order 
was issued on the ground that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the property 
concerned was associated with terrorist and related activities.
Contestations of restraint orders have featured in many reported cases. Suspects have 
challenged the legality of restraint orders granted to the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions in terms of sections 24A-29A of POCA. There are several examples in the 
decisions of the courts where POCA has been invoked in situations in which a person was 
suspected of committing one or more of the offences under the Act, or in some instances 
also offences under other pieces of legislation. These include racketeering and money-
laundering under POCA and drug-traffi cking under the Drugs and Drug Traffi cking Act.44
Examples of POCA being used in this way include ABSA Bank Ltd v Fraser and another,45 
where the respondent’s immovable assets and money, R1.8 million, were restrained because 
of allegations of money-laundering, racketeering and drugs-traffi cking. Similarly, in 
Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate,46 the respondent’s immovable 
property (two houses) and vehicles were subject to a restraint order on allegations that they 
were bought using proceeds of drug dealing; and in Mngomezulu and others v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions47 the appellant’s 12 immovable properties and his movable 
property, such as Persian carpets, works of art, vehicles and numerous bank accounts, were 
subjects of a restraint order on allegations that they were instrumentalities of offences 
or proceeds of unlawful activities – drug dealing in this instance. Fraud relating to, and 
theft of, insurance premiums, where defendants allegedly forged certifi cates and other 
documents and stole R14.8 million from their clients, led to the High Court in National 
Director of Public Prosecution v Alexander and others48 granting a restraint order against 
the property bought using the fraudulently acquired money. In National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Mcasa and another,49 where the respondents kidnapped a businessman’s 
daughter and released her on receiving a ransom of R1.8 million and after their conviction, 
the Court issued a restraint order against their plot of land, cars, home theatre, insurance 
policy, and bank accounts. Similarly a restraint order was upheld in National Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Mohamed and others50 where the defendant, a former attorney, was 
facing charges of stealing money that his clients had received from the Road Accident 
Fund as compensation. Finally, illicit trading in platinum group metals led, in National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Naidoo and others,51 to a restraint order being granted 
against the property of 22 defendants and 23 respondents who allegedly dealt illegally in 
platinum.
In terms of section 38 of POCA the National Director of Public Prosecutions is empowered 
to lodge an ex parte application to the High Court for an order (called a preservation of 
property order) prohibiting any person from dealing with any property in any manner if 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the property concerned has one or more of 
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the following features: is an instrumentality of an offence referred to in Schedule 1 of 
the POCA; is the proceeds of unlawful activities; or is property associated with terrorist 
and related activities. Section 48(1) provides that ‘[i]f a preservation of property order is 
in force the National Director [of Public Prosecutions], may apply to a High Court for an 
order forfeiting to the State all or any of the property that is subject to the preservation of 
property order.’ A review of the case law shows that forfeiture orders have been issued in the 
following circumstances: against a residential property that was being used to manufacture 
drugs;52 a farm on which drugs were being manufactured and a trailer that was bought 
with the proceeds of the drugs;53 a large quantity of diving equipment, a small fi shing ship, 
and a Toyota 4x4 Landcruiser after the owners were convicted of being in possession and 
transportation of abalone illegally;54 a building for being used as a brothel;55 a building for 
being used for illegal gambling (operating a casino illegally);56 and money that was offered 
to a police offi cer as a bribe.57
There are at least three important points to note from the above discussion: 
 One, because of the fact that POCA targets the property of suspects and offenders, • 
the courts have interpreted it in such a way that its objective is balanced against 
constitutional right to property of the suspect or criminal concerned. It is against 
this background that the element of proportionality was introduced into the equation 
to ensure that property which would otherwise have been legally forfeited to the 
state in terms of POCA is not forfeited if the forfeiture would be disproportionate. 
 Two, courts have limited the application of POCA to only those offences that are • 
diffi cult to detect and prosecute. Crimes that can be addressed adequately through 
ordinary criminal law have been interpreted as falling outside the ambit of POCA. 
However, one could argue that, because the courts have interpreted POCA as applicable 
not only to organised crimes but also to cases which one would not ordinarily classify 
as organised crimes, the danger looms large that its application to the latter cases 
may result in inconsistent outcomes. This is because it is more likely to depend on the 
discretion of the judge to determine whether POCA should be applicable in borderline 
cases – that is, cases that could be prosecuted both under ordinary criminal law and 
POCA. Thus, in some borderline cases POCA will be invoked and in others will not.
 Three, whereas it is widely believed that organised crime almost always has an • 
international dimension – with both national and international or regional actors 
– all the cases reviewed show that the offenders or people whose property was 
confi scated or forfeited to the state were South African nationals. Most importantly, 
all the offences were committed not by people in highly organised criminal groups 
or gangs but by one or more individuals who were purely motivated by profi t. The 
author was unable to fi nd a reported case in which the crime was committed with 
proven aim of the offenders ‘smuggling’ their property out of South Africa.
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CONCLUSION 5. 
Combating organised crime remains a complex challenge facing not only the South African 
government but also the international community. This type of crime threatens not only 
the lives and well-being of the citizenry but also democracy.58 The ten years since the 
coming into force of POCA has seen the judiciary, while relying heavily on foreign case 
law,59 developing a rich jurisprudence on the most controversial provisions of the Act. 
Broadly speaking, the courts have got the balance right. Although fully cognisant of the 
dangers associated with organised crime and the legislature’s determination to combat it, 
the courts have made sure that safeguards are put in place to ensure that key human rights, 
especially the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s property, are not violated in the 
‘war’ on organised crime. It is against this background that the principle that a forfeiture 
order can only be made if it passes the proportionality test has been developed. 
The question of whether ten years since its coming into force POCA has contributed 
signifi cantly to the fi ght against organised crime is still debatable. However, what is not in 
dispute is that hundreds of individuals have had their property, in many instances worth 
several millions of rand, confi scated or forfeited to the state in terms of POCA. In allowing 
this to happen, while seeking to guarantee rights, the courts have played a vital role.
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Constitutional Court of Appeal. In cases where a matter was, for example, decided by the High Court and appealed again to 
the Constitutional Court, each decision is counted separately for the purpose of this study because it raises different legal 
issues at every stage.
For a brief discussion of the history and role of the Asset Forfeiture Unit, see M. Montesh, ‘An Analysis of the Role of the 18. 
South African Asset Forfeiture Unit and the Special Investigating Unit’ (2009) 22(2) Acta Criminologica 31–40. Since 2004 
the Asset Forfeiture Unit has registered some of the following ‘successes’ or achievements: the number of new restraint 
orders successfully applied for were 161 in 2004/2005 (with the value of R234,406,000), 252 in 2005/2006 (with the value 
of R344,129,000), 252 in 2006/2007 (with the value of R1,294,569,000), 223 in 2007/2008 (with the value of R395,229,000) 
and 275 in 2008/2009 (with the value of R320,254,000); the number of completed forfeiture cases: 151 in 2004/2005 
(with the value of R172,855,000), 221 in 2005/2006 (with the value of R106,748,000), 242 in 2006/2007 (with the value of 
R100,600,000), 223 in 2007/2008 (with the value of R127,322,000), and 277 in 2008/2009 (with the value of R271,588,000). 
The success rates in judgments fl uctuated as follows: 65.2% in 2004/2005, 72.4% in 2005/2006, 81.8% in 2006/2007, 80.0% 
in 2007/2008, and 63.2% in 2008/2009. See Annual Report of the National Prosecuting Authority 2008/2009 (2009) page 
39.
The right to property is protected under section 25 of the Constitution.19. 
Mohunram and another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and another (Law Review Project as amicus curiae) 20. (note 
15 above) 154.
For a detailed discussion of the retrospective application of POCA see 21. National Director of Public Prosecutions v Basson 
2001(2) SACR 712(SCA).
National Director of Public Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) LTD; National Director of Public Prosecutions v 37 22. 
Gillespie Street Durban (Pty) Ltd and another; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan 2004(2) SACR 
208(SCA), paragraph 31.
National Director of Public Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) LTD; National Director of Public Prosecutions v 37 23. 
Gillespie Street Durban (Pty) Ltd and another; National Director of Public Prosecutions v Seevnarayan (note 22 above), 
paragraph 34.
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Braun and another24.  2009(2) SACR 390(WCC).
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Van Staden and others25.  2007(1) SACR 338(SCA), paragraph 7.
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Van Staden and others26.  (note 25 above), paragraph 7.
For a detailed discussion of the protection of third parties’ interest under POCA see J.Y. Nel, ‘The Constitutional Rights of 27. 
Children and the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998’ (2003) 28(1) Journal for Juridical Science 97, 102–106.
Mohunram and another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and another (Law Review Project as amicus curiae)28.  (note 
15 above), paragraph 130 per Moseneke DCJ dissenting in part.
Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 29. 2006(2) SACR 525(CC). In Mohunram and another v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and another (Law Review Project as amicus curiae) 2007(2) SACR 145(CC), paragraph 143, Sachs J also 
held that ‘[i]n approaching the question of proportionality in relation to the forfeiture of an instrumentality of an offence, it 
is necessary to weigh the purpose of the legislation against the effect of the forfeiture on the effected person.’
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Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 30. (note 29 above) paragraph 62.
In 31. S v Eyssen 2009(1) SACR 406(SCA) the High Court had sentenced the accused to 20 years’ imprisonment for racketeering 
and the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and the sentence on the ground that the appellant’s activities did 
not amount to racketeering as defi ned in section 2 of POCA.
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Moodley and others 32. 2009(2) SA 588(SCA). The defendants unsuccessfully argued 
that their racketeering charges had been brought illegally because they had been brought without the authorisation of 
the National Director of Public Prosecutions. See also S v De Vries and others 2008 (4) SA 441(C) where the accused 
unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the racketeering charges brought against them. In Fraser v ABSA Bank Ltd 
(National Director of Public Prosecutions as amicus curiae) 2007(3) 484(CC) the applicant argued successfully that the legal 
guardian (curator bonis) should sell some of the property that had been a subject of a restraint order for the applicant to 
be able to fund the reasonable legal expenses relating to his racketeering trial. In National Director of Public Prosecutions 
v Carolus and others 2000(1) SA 1127(SCA) the appellant argued unsuccessfully that the preservation orders under POCA 
could be invoked retrospectively in racketeering-related offences.
In 33. S v De Vries and others 2009(1) SACR 613(C), the accused were convicted of, inter alia, racketeering but the judgment is 
silent on the sentences imposed.
Under section 38 an application for a preservation order is made by the National Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte 34. 
and the High Court is obliged to make that order if there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe that the property concerned: 
(a) is an instrumentality of an offence referred to in Schedule 1 [of POCA]; (b) is the proceeds of unlawful activities; or (c) 
is property associated with terrorist and related activities.’ It was held in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Van 
Heerden and others 2004(2) 26(C) at 34 that ‘at the preservation stage…the applicant is required to establish under s 38(2) no 
more than a prima facie case that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the property concerned …(b) is the proceeds 
of unlawful activities’.
Chapters 5 and 6 of POCA. See 35. National Director of Public Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) LTD; National Director 
of Public Prosecutions v 37 Gillespie Street Durban (Pty) Ltd and another; National Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Seevnarayan (note 22 above), paragraph 7 where it was held that a confi scation order can only be made after the accused 
has been convicted whereas a forfeiture order can be made whether prosecution takes place or not.
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Ncongwane and others 36. 2005(2) SACR 377(N) where the accused were convicted of 
robbery but the court declined to order the confi scation of their property on the ground that the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that they had derived benefi t from the property they had robbed.
Section 50 of POCA.37. 
In 38. S v Shaik and others 2008(5) SA 354(CC) the offender’s property was confi scated after his conviction for corruption. 
In 39. S v Peterson en’n ander 2001(1) SACR 16(SCA) the appellants were sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment for a gang-
related murder. Their appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against their conviction was dismissed. In S v Khambule 
2001(1) SACR 501(SCA) the appellants’ appeal against their 35 years’ imprisonment for gang-related murders and robberies 
was dismissed.
In 40. S v Eyssen (note 31 above) the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the appellant’s conviction for offences relating to 
criminal gang activities, on amongst other grounds, that the evidence did not show that the appellant gave instructions to 
other members of the gang to commit robbery.
Section 18(1) provides that ‘[w]henever a defendant is convicted of an offence the court convicting the defendant may, on 41. 
the application of the public prosecutor, enquire into any benefi t which the defendant may have derived from – (a) that 
offence; (b) any other offence of which the defendant has been convicted at the same trial; and (c) any criminal activity 
which the court fi nds to be suffi ciently related to those offences, and if the court fi nds that the defendant has so benefi ted, 
the court may, in addition to any punishment which it may impose in respect of the offence, make an against the defendant 
for the payment to the State of any amount it considers appropriate and the court may make any further orders as it may 
deem fi t to ensure the effectiveness and fairness of that order.’ Section 19 deals with the value of proceeds of unlawful 
activities in confi scation cases; section 20 provides for the amounts which might be realized in confi scation cases; section 
21 governs the manner in which the public prosecutor can tender in evidence statements relating to proceeds of unlawful 
activities in confi scation cases; section 22 deals with evidence relating to unlawful activities in confi scation cases; section 
23 lays down the effect of confi scation orders; and section 24 provides for the procedure of securing a confi scation order 
where the person affected or to be affected by that order absconds or dies. It was held in National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Basson (note 21 above) that a confi scation order in terms of section 18 of POCA could not be imposed based 
on a conviction for an offence committed before the Act came into force.
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Kyriacou42.  2003(2) SACR 524(SCA), paragraph 10.
Schedule 1 provides for 34 different types of offences including offences in other pieces of legislation such as under the 43. 
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Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act (Act 32 of 2007); Sexual Offences Act (Act 23 of 1957); 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (Act 12 of 2004); General Law Amendment Act (Act 62 of 1995); Drugs 
and Drug Traffi cking Act (Act 140 of 1992); Arms and Ammunition Act (Act 75 of 1969); Intimidation Act (Act 72 of 1982); 
and the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (Act 33 of 2004).
Drugs and Drug Traffi cking Act 140 of 1992.44. 
ABSA Bank Ltd v Fraser and another45.  (note 7 above). 
Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate 46. 2000(1) SACR 105(C).
Mngomezulu and others v National Director of Public Prosecutions47.  2007(2) SACR 274(SCA).
National Director of Public Prosecution v Alexander and others48.  (note 14 above).
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mcasa and another49.  2000(1) SACR 263(TkH).
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mohamed and others50.  2003(2) SACR 258(C).
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Naidoo and others51.  2006(2) SACR 403(T). 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Cole and Others52.  2005(2) SACR 553(W) in which the court ordered that a 
residential house be forfeited to the state because drug-manufacturing machines and drugs were found on the premises. 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Patterson and another 2001(2) SACR 665(C) in dismissing the applicant’s 
application for the forfeiture of the respondents’ property to the state as an instrumentality of crime because, inter alia, 
some people had been seen smoking drugs on the premises, the court held that ‘[t]he mere fact that one smokes a prohibited 
substance on a property does not make the property instrumental in the smoking. Selling from the property or on the 
property would obviously be a different matter’ (at 671). In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Prophet 2003(2) SACR 
287(C), a forfeiture order was issued against a house in which drugs were being manufactured. An appeal against this order 
was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Appeal (Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2005(2) SACR 670(SCA) 
and the Constitutional Court (Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions (note 29 above).
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mazibuko and others53.  2008(2) SACR 611(N) where the court ordered that a farm 
(on which the drugs were being manufactured) and trailer (that was being used in the business) be forfeited to the state 
as instrumentalities of crime. See also Mazibuko and another v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009(2) SACR 
368(SCA), where the court dealt, inter alia, with the issue of property that is ordered forfeit to the state which is owned by 
spouses married in community of property.
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Engels 54. 2005(1) SACR 99(C). In National Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Swart 2005(2) SACR 186(SE) the defendant’s vehicle, in which 1190 illegally fi shed abalone were found, was declared an 
instrumentality of an offence and was ordered forfeit to the state.
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Geyser and another55.  2008(2) SACR 103(SCA) in which a forfeiture order was issued 
against the defendant’s immovable property as a result of his having kept a brothel.
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mohunram and others 56. 2006(1) SACR 554(SCA).
National Director of Public Prosecutions: In Re Appeals 57. 2005(2) SACR 610(N). It was held that the money that two vehicle 
thieves had offered to the police offi cer as a bribe for the latter not to arrest them was an instrumentality of an offence – 
corruption – and had to be forfeited to the State.
It has been observed that organised crime ‘presents exceptional risks and challenges to the social, political and economic 58. 
well-being of states and to the international community.’ See A. Wright, Organised Crime (2006) 1. 
Especially from the United States.59. 
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